## IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS STATE OF MISSOURI

RICHARD DALEEN	)
Plaintiff,	) Case No.
v.	) Division No.
CITY ÓF BERKELEY Serve:	) ) )
City Clerk	) Jury Trial Requested
City of Berkeley	)
8425 Airport Rd	)
Berkeley, MO 63134	)
Defendant.	)

### **PETITION**

COMES NOW Plaintiff Richard Daleen, by and through his undersigned counsel, and for his cause of action against Defendant the City of Berkeley ("City"), and states to the Court as follows:

## **COMMON TO ALL COUNTS**

- 1. Plaintiff is, and at all times pertinent hereto was a resident of St. Charles County, Missouri.
  - 2. Berkeley is a city located in St. Louis County, Missouri.
  - 3. The City of Berkeley Police Department is a political subdivision of the City.
- 4. The Court has jurisdiction over this action because the parties acts and/or omissions by Defendant giving rise to Plaintiff's causes of action in this Petition occurred in St. Louis County, Missouri.



5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 508.010 because all acts alleged occurred in St. Louis County and Defendant is a city located in St. Louis County.

### **BACKGROUND**

- 6. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 4 by reference as if fully set forth herein.
- 7. Plaintiff began his employment with the City as a Police Officer on May 28, 2008.
- 8. The City's Mayor, Chief of Police and second in command at the Police

  Department are African American. The Police Department is predominantly African American.
  - 9. Plaintiff is Caucasian.
- 10. On January 31, 2014, Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice, injuring his right ankle and knee.
- 11. On February 3, 2014, Plaintiff contacted the City Police Department and informed them of his injury. Plaintiff was immediately placed on sick leave.
- 12. Plaintiff was initially treated at Progress West Hospital and followed up with Orthopedist Dr. John Powell On February 4, 2014.
- 13. Plaintiff was diagnosed with an ankle sprain and was released to work with light duty restrictions.
- 14. Plaintiff forwarded the above-referenced medical documentation to the City Police Department and requested light duty.

- 15. Plaintiff was informed by the Assistant Chief of Police that Plaintiff's light duty request could not be accommodated because he was not hurt at work.
- 16. Plaintiff exhausted his sick leave and subsequently requested and received leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) beginning February 23, 2014.
- 17. On March 25, 2014, Plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his back and returned to Progress West Hospital. He was diagnosed with a blood clot that had travelled to his lungs, and was immediately placed on anticoagulation medication.
- 18. Plaintiff's primary Physician is Dr. Christopher Normile and his Hematologist is Dr. Pascale A. Salem. Both doctors found it relevant that Plaintiff had a previous blood clot. Given this fact, Plaintiff was prescribed anticoagulation medication.
- 19. Plaintiff's above-referenced physicians issued correspondence stating that due to medical reasons which include being on anticoagulation medications, Plaintiff could return to work as a police officer but only in a position that had a reduced risk of head injury, gunshot wound, or other serious injury.
- 20. Plaintiff's treating physicians stated that detective work or desk duty would be adequately safe while Plaintiff was on blood thinning medications.
- 21. A true and correct copy of the above-referenced correspondence from Dr. Normile and Dr. Salem are attached hereto, incorporated herein by reference and marked Exhibits A and B.
  - 22. The City has said this duty is not available.
  - 23. Plaintiff's FMLA leave expired on May 19, 2014 after 12 weeks (or 480 hours).

- 24. Plaintiff spoke with Faye Betts, Human Resource Manager for the City, and informed her that he had a permanent disability as a result of the injury to his ankle and the fact that he was taking prescribed anticoagulation medication, and once again requested to be placed on light or modified duty.
- 25. Ms. Betts told Plaintiff that he could not go on light duty since he was not hurt while at work.
- 26. Plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Joshua W. Beeks, Acting City Manager, dated May 30, 2014, stating that "the City of Berkeley has met its obligation to preserve [Plaintiff's] position for twelve weeks as defined by the Family and Medical Leave Act. As requested you have met with and discussed your employment with Chief McCall and have indicated that your medical status continued to require you to be off of work and unable to fully assume the duties and responsibilities of your position. Because of your inability to fully perform the duties and responsibilities of your position, it is necessary to end your employment with the City of Berkeley. The effective separation date for your employment will be May 30, 2014 and you will be considered as leaving in good standing."
- 27. A true and correct copy of the above-referenced letter is attached hereto, incorporated herein by reference and marked Exhibit C.
- 28. Plaintiff had acceptable to excellent employment reviews while working as a City of Berkeley Police Officer.
- 29. Upon information and belief, the City has made medical-related accommodations in the past for other employees, all of whom were African American, but refused to do so for Plaintiff.

- 30. For example, Michelle Merriweather is a detective for the City. She was originally hired as a patrol officer, but when she was diagnosed with Sickle Cell Anemia she was given a permanent detective position.
- 31. In addition, Terrell Shumbert was hired as a patrol officer. When he was diagnosed with a heart condition he was allowed to become a City corrections officer.
- 32. Pregnant African American police officers employed by the City have traditionally been allowed to work light duty.
- 33. Upon information and belief, none of the similarly situated police officers who were provided reasonable accommodations by Defendant had taken FMLA leave.
- 34. The City could have accommodated the restrictions imposed by Plaintiff's treating physicians, who felt full duty was risky medically since a blow to his head could be fatal while on blood thinners.
- 35. For example, Plaintiff could have worked as a dispatcher or assumed booking duties for the Department.
- 36. On or about July 22, 2014, Plaintiff initiated proceedings against Defendant with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- 37. A true and correct copy of the 2014 MCHR and EEOC Complaint is attached hereto, incorporated herein by reference, and marked Exhibit D.

- 38. An EEOC mediation was scheduled to commence on January 21, 2015. However, Plaintiff was notified by the mediator on January 15, 2015 that Defendant refused to mediate the matter.
  - 39. Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the MCHR dated March 27, 2015.
- 40. A true and correct copy of the March 27, 2015 MCHR Right-to-Sue Letter is attached hereto, incorporated herein by reference, and marked Exhibit E.
- 41. On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division related to his EEOC complaint.
- 42. The letter stated that Plaintiff has "the right to institute a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, *et seq.*, against the [City of Berkeley]".
- 43. A true and correct copy of the May 28, 2015 EEOC Right-to-Sue Letter is attached hereto, incorporated herein by reference, and marked Exhibit F.
  - 44. On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division related to his EEOC complaint.
- 45. The letter stated that Plaintiff has "the right to institute a civil action under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12111, et seq., against the [City of Berkeley]".
- 46. A true and correct copy of the May 28, 2015 EEOC Right-to-Sue Letter is attached hereto, incorporated herein by reference, and marked Exhibit G.

# COUNT I – DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER THE MISSOURI HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (RACE DISCRIMINATION)

47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 46 by reference as if fully set forth herein.

- 48. Defendant has, and at all times pertinent hereto had, more than 15 employees.
- 49. Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation for his injury as directed by his treating physician.
- 50. Defendant refused to accommodate Plaintiff by reassigning him to another position within the Police Department.
- 51. Plaintiff performed his job with Defendant satisfactorily and without complaint from the time he was hired in May 2008 until his injury in January 2014, and yet was not provided reasonable accommodations in light of the work restrictions imposed by his treating physician.
- 52. Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his injury and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 53. Defendant provided reasonable accommodations to other similarly situated African American police officers.
- 54. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on or about May 30, 2014, because Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his disability and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 55. Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff, and ultimately fired Plaintiff, because of his race.
- 56. Since his termination from employment with Defendant, Plaintiff has been unable to find work as a police officer.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court for judgment after jury trial for an amount exceeding \$25,000.00, for punitive damages, for costs and attorneys' fees which might be rightfully recovered; and for such further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

# COUNT II – DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER THE MISSOURI HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION)

- 57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 56 by reference as if fully set forth herein.
  - 58. Defendant has, and at all times pertinent hereto had, more than 15 employees.
- 59. Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation for his injury as directed by his treating physician.
- 60. Defendant refused to accommodate Plaintiff by reassigning him to another position within the Police Department.
- 61. Plaintiff performed his job with Defendant satisfactorily and without complaint from the time he was hired in May 2008 until his injury in January 2014, and yet was not provided reasonable accommodations in light of the work restrictions imposed by his treating physician.
- 62. Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his injury and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 63. Defendant provided reasonable accommodations to other similarly situated African American police officers.

- 64. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on or about May 30, 2014, because Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his disability and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 65. Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff, and ultimately fired Plaintiff because of his disability.
- 66. Since his termination from employment with Defendant, Plaintiff has been unable to find work as a police officer.

# COUNT III- FAILURE TO ACCOMODATE UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

- 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 66 by reference as if fully set forth herein.
  - 68. Defendant has, and at all times pertinent hereto had, more than 15 employees.
- 69. Plaintiff has a physical impairment that substantially limits his major life activities in that Plaintiff is subject to blood clots and, therefore, is prescribed anticoagulation medication.
- 70. The above-referenced physical impairment has resulted in Plaintiff having a disability as defined by the ADA.
- 71. There is a record of Plaintiff's disability and Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's disability.

- 72. Plaintiff is qualified to perform the job-essential functions of a police officer with reasonable accommodations.
- 73. Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation for his disability as directed by his treating physicians.
- 74. Plaintiff performed his job with Defendant satisfactorily and without complaint from the time he was hired in May 2008 until his injury in January 2014, and yet was not provided reasonable accommodations in light of the work restrictions imposed by his treating physician.
- 75. Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his disability and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 76. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on or about May 30, 2014, because Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his disability and subsequent medical restrictions.

## <u>COUNT IV – DISPARATE TREATMENT</u> <u>UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT</u>

- 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 76 by reference as if fully set forth herein.
  - 78. Defendant has, and at all times pertinent hereto had, more than 15 employees.

- 79. Plaintiff has a physical impairment that substantially limits his major life activities in that Plaintiff is subject to blood clots and, therefore, is prescribed anticoagulation medication.
- 80. There is a record of Plaintiff's physical impairment and Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's physical impairment.
- 81. Plaintiff is qualified to perform the job-essential functions of a police officer with reasonable accommodations.
- 82. Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation for his physical impairment as directed by his treating physicians.
- 83. Plaintiff performed his job with Defendant satisfactorily and without complaint from the time he was hired in May 2008 until his injury in January 2014, and yet was not provided reasonable accommodations in light of the work restrictions imposed by his treating physician.
- 84. Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his injury and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 85. Defendant provided reasonable accommodations to other similarly situated African American police officers.
- 86. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on or about May 30, 2014, because Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his injury and subsequent medical restrictions.

Electronically Filed - St Louis County - June 19, 2015 - 03:20 PM

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court for judgment after jury trial for an amount exceeding \$25,000.00, for punitive damages, for costs and attorneys' fees which might be rightfully recovered; and for such further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

## COUNT V - DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

- Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 86 by reference as if 87. fully set forth herein.
  - Defendant has, and at all times pertinent hereto had, more than 15 employees. 88.
- Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation for his injury as directed by his 89. treating physician.
- Defendant refused to accommodate Plaintiff by reassigning him to another 90. position within the Police Department.
- Plaintiff performed his job with Defendant satisfactorily and without complaint 91. from the time he was hired in May 2008 until his injury in January 2014, and yet was not provided reasonable accommodations in light of the work restrictions imposed by his treating physician.
- Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of 92. his injury and subsequent medical restrictions.
- Defendant provided reasonable accommodations to other similarly situated 93. African American police officers.

- 94. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on or about May 30, 2014, because Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his injury and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 95. Defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff, and ultimately fired Plaintiff, because of his race.
- 96. Since his termination from employment with Defendant, Plaintiff has been unable to find work as a police officer.

# COUNT VI – RETALIATION UNDER THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

- 97. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 96 by reference as if fully set forth herein.
- 98. Plaintiff requested and received leave under the FMLA for his own serious health condition beginning February 23, 2014.
- 99. Plaintiff's FMLA leave expired on May 19, 2014 after 12 weeks (or 480 hours).
- 100. Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation for his injury as directed by his treating physician.
- 101. Defendant refused to accommodate Plaintiff by reassigning him to another position within the Police Department.

- 102. Defendant provided reasonable accommodations to other similarly situated police officers, none of whom had taken FMLA leave.
- 103. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on or about May 30, 2014, because defendant refused to provide reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff in light of his injury and subsequent medical restrictions.
- 104. Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for taking leave protected under the FMLA.
- 105. Since his termination from employment with Defendant, Plaintiff has been unable to find work as a police officer.

Respectfully Submitted,

Kodner Watkins & Kloecker, LC

By: ALBERT S. WATKINS, #B4553

ROBERT C. SEIPP, #59339

Attorneys for Defendant

The Bank of America Building

7800 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 700

St. Louis, Missouri 63105

(314) 727-9111

(314) 727-9110 Facsimile

E-Mail: <u>albertswatkins@kwklaw.net</u> <u>rseipp@kwklaw.net</u>



MERCY CLINIC FAMILY MEDICINE - ZUMBEHL SUITE 130A 1820 Zumbehl Rd, Ste 130a Saint Charles MO 63303-2761 Dept: 636-947-2334 Dept Fax: 636-940-5739

4/9/2014

RE: Richard A Daleen

To Whom It May Concern:

Due to medical reasons, Richard A Daleen will require anticoagulation medications for at least the next 3 months. It is my opinion that he may return to work as a police officer only in a position that is at reduced risk for head injury, gunshot wounds etc, than his current position as a patrol officer. Detective work or desk work would be adequately safe in my opinion.

Sincerely,

Christopher Normile, MD

15SL-CC02097

SSM CANCER CARE NORTH LAKE ST LOUIS 400 Medical Plaza Ste 100 Lake St Louis MO 63367 636-639-8600

8/1/2014

RE: Richard A Daleen 940 Annabrook Park Dr O Fallon MO 63366-2967

Pascale A Salem, MD SSM HealthCare

To Whom It May Concern,

Richard A Daleen is currently under my care for anticoagulation until further notice.

Due to medical reasons which include being on anticoagulation medications, Richard A Daleen may return to work in the roll as a police officer but only in a position that is in a reduce risk of head injury, gun shot wound, etc. This would include a position that is less risky than his current position as a police officer. A detective or desk work would be safer while on blood thinning medications.

Sincerely,

Rachel A. Allmon, RN

Pascale A Salem, MD

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15SL-CC02097

8425 Airport Road

Berkeley, Missouri 63134-2098

314 524-3313

May 30, 2014

Richard Daleen 940 Annabrook Park Dr O'Fallon, MO 63366

Re: EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Dear Mr. Daleen,

This letter is to notify you of your employment status with the City of Berkeley. As of February 23, 2014 you have requested and received Family and Medical Leave for 12 weeks (or 480 hours) effective through May 19, 2014. This leave period included the balance of you vacation and sick leave, which were applied to your leave as well as all leave that has been earned during this time period

City of Berkeley Personnel Handbook, Section 9.02 Family and Medical Leave policy states "Once the twelve (12) work week FMLA time frame has been exhausted in the year the employee will no longer be entitled to benefits provided under FMLA for the absence."

The City of Berkeley has met its obligation to preserve your position for twelve weeks as defined by the Family and Medical Leave Act. As requested you have met with and discussed your employment with Chief McCall and have indicated that your medical status continues to require you to be off of work and unable to fully assume the duties and responsibilities of your position. Because of your inability to fully perform the duties and responsibilities of your position, it is necessary to end your employment with the City of Berkeley. The effective separation date for your employment will be May 30, 2014 and you will be considered as leaving in good standing. Should your circumstances change and you return to a physical status that would allow you to fully perform the duties of Patrol Officer, you would be eligible to reapply for future vacancies with the city of Berkeley.

All City of Berkeley equipment including uniforms must be returned to Frank McCall, Police Chief.

Respectfully submitted

√oshua W. Beeks, Acting City Manager

betuan. Beek

cc: Frank McCall, Police Chief

Faye Betts, Human Resource Manager

Case: 4:15-cv-01266-AGF Doc. #: 1-3 File	d: 08/18/1	~		geID #: 49 -CC02097	
CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION	Charge	Presented To:		(ies) Charge No(s):	
This form is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. See enclosed Privacy Act		FEPA	, (geney)	Perfected	
Statement and other information before completing this form.		EEOC	560	-2014-01383	
Missouri Commission O			300		
Stale or local Agency		agins		and EEOC	
Name (indicate Mr., Ms., Mrs.)		Home Phone (Incl. Ar	ea Code)	Date of Birth	
Mr. Richard A. Daleen		(314) 910-0	316	08-26-1968	
Street Address City, State and	ZIP Code				
940 Annabrook Park Drive O Fallon, N	1O 63366				
Named is the Employer, Labor Organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticeship C Discriminated Against Me or Others. (If more than two, list under PARTICULARS be	committee, or S elow.)	tate or Local Govern	ment Agenc	y That I Believe	
Name		No. Employees, Member		Phone No. (Include Area Code)	
CITY OF BERKELEY POLICE DEPT		101 - 200	(3	14) 524-3313	
Street Address City, State and					
5850 North Hanley Saint Louis,	, MO 63134	ļ			
Name		No. Employees, Members	Phone	No. (Include Area Code)	
Street Address City, State and	ZIP Code				
	zii oodc				
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es).)				N TOOK PLACE	
X RACE COLOR SEX RELIGION N	Earliest Latest NATIONAL ORIGIN 02-04-2014 05-30-2		05-30-2014		
RETALIATION AGE X DISABILITY GENET	ENETIC INFORMATION CONTINUING ACTION			NG ACTION	
THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional paper is needed, atlach extra sheet(s)):  I was hired by the above named employer May 28, 2008, as a Police Officer. 1	was under the	supervision of Chi	ef McCall w	tho is a black	
On January 31, 2014, I suffered a severe injury to my ankle when I slipped and and informed them of the injury and I was immediately put on sick leave. On to work with light duty restrictions. I faxed my medical documentation into m was told by the Assistant Chief of Police that I could not be accommodated by on February 24, 2014, I went on f FMLA until May 19, 2014 when it expired. I spermanent disability as a result of the injury to my ankle and I requested light because I was not hurt at work. On June 2, 2014, I received a letter from my edidn't return to full duty within (30) days, I would be terminated. I have been the Michelle Merriweather and Terrell Shumpert have both been accommodated for I believe I have been discriminated against because of my race white and due of 1964, as amended and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).	d fell on ice. C February 4, 20 y employer in ecause I was r poke with Fay duty once ago mployer which reated differer or a disability	on February 3, 2014, 14, I saw an orthopo which a light duty r not hurt at work. I e: e Betts of H. R. and ain and I was told th n said if my condition thy from the black a related issue and I v	I contacted edic doctor estriction v khausted a informed h at I couldn in hadn't ch imployees i vas denied.	d my employer who released me was requested. I il my leave and ter that I had a it go on light duty hanged or if I in my category.	
will advise the agencies if I change my address or phone number and I will cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their		ecessary for Stale and L			
I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.	wear or affirm to best of my kno SNATURE OF CO	hat I have read the allowledge, information OMPLAINANT	oove charge and belief.	and that it is true to	
Dale Charging Party Signature	BSCRIBED AND onth, day, year)	SWORN TO BEFORE N		EXHIBIT	

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MISSOU EPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL

ATIONS 15SL-CC02097

## MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON GOVERNOR

RYAN MCKENNA DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR

SARA NELL LAMPE COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON



Richard A. Daleen 940 Annabrook Park Drive O'Fallon, MO 63366

RE: Daleen vs. City of Berkeley Police Dept. FE-7/14-21913 560-2014-01383

EXHIBIT

Region E

E-7/14-21913

The Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) is terminating its proceedings and issuing this notice of your right to sue under the Missouri Human Rights Act because you have requested a notice of your right to sue.

This letter indicates your right to bring a civil action within 90 days of this notice against the respondent(s) named in the complaint. Such an action may be brought in any circuit court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred but it must be brought no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred or its reasonable discovery. Upon issuance of this notice, the MCHR is terminating all proceedings relating to the complaint. No person may file or reinstate a complaint with the MCHR after the issuance of a notice of right to sue relating to the same practice or act. You are hereby notified of your right to sue the Respondent(s) named in your complaint in state circuit court. THIS MUST BE DONE WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE OR YOUR RIGHT TO SUE IS LOST.

You are also notified that the Executive Director is hereby administratively closing this case and terminating all MCHR proceedings relating to it. This notice of right to sue has no effect on the suit-filing period for any federal claims. This notice of right to sue is being issued as required by Section 213.111.1, RSMo, because it has been requested in writing 180 days after filing of the complaint. This complaint was being initially processed by the EEOC and MCHR has not been notified of their determination. Please note that administrative processing of this complaint, including determinations of jurisdiction, has not been completed.

Respectfully,

Alisa Warren, Ph.D. Executive Director

City of Berkeley Police Dept. 5850 North Hanley St. Louis, MO 63134

March 27, 2015

Date

D. Andrew Weigley 7800 Forsyth, Suite 700 Clayton, MO 63105 Via email

 $\boxtimes$ 

3315W. TRUMAN BLVD, P.O. BOX 1129 JEFFERSON CITY, MO 65102-1129 PHONE: 573-751-2325 FAX: 573-751-2905 П


111 N. 7TH STREET, SUITE 903 ST. LOUIS, MO 63101-2100 PHONE: 314-340-7590 FAX: 314-340-7238

P.O. Box 1300 Ozark, MO 65721-1300 FAX: 417-485-6024

1410 GENESSEE, SUITE 260 KANSAS CITY, MO 64102 FAX: 816-889-3582

106 ARTHUR STREET SUITE D SIKESTON, MO 63801-5454 FAX: 573-472-5321 Case: 4:15-cv-01266-AGF Doc. #: 1-3 Filed: 08/18/15 Page: 20 of 25 P

U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division



CERTIFIED MAIL 7010 0290 0000 2016 4055

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Karen Ferguson , EMP, PHB, Room 4239 Washington, DC 20530

May 19, 2015

Mr. Richard A. Daleen c/o D. Andrew Weigley, Esquire Law Offices of Kodner, Watkins, et al. 7800 Forsyth Blvd. 7th Floor St. Louis, MO 63105

Re: EEOC Charge Against City of Berkeley Police Dept.

No. 560201401383

Dear Mr. Daleen:

Because you filed the above charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and more than 180 days have elapsed since the date the Commission assumed jurisdiction over the charge, and no suit based thereon has been filed by this Department, and because you through your attorney have specifically requested this Notice, you are hereby notified that you have the right to institute a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., against the above-named respondent.

If you choose to commence a civil action, such suit must be filed in the appropriate Court within 90 days of your receipt of this Notice.

The investigative file pertaining to your case is located in the EEOC St. Louis District Office, St Louis, MO.

This Notice should not be taken to mean that the Department of Justice has made a judgment as to whether or not your case is meritorious.

Sincerely,

Vanita Gupta

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Civil Rights Division

Karen L. Ferguson

Supervisory Civil Rights Analyst Employment Litigation Section


cc: St. Louis District Office, EEOC City of Berkeley Police Dept.

Case: 4:15-cv-01266-AGF Doc. #: 1-3 Filed: 08/18/15 Page: 21 of 25

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U.S. Department of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division



CERTIFIED MAIL 7010 0290 0000 2016 4055

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Karen Ferguson , EMP, PHB, Room 4239 Washington, DC 20530

May 19, 2015

Mr. Richard A. Daleen c/o D. Andrew Weigley, Esquire Law Offices of Kodner, Watkins, et al. 7800 Forsyth Blvd. 7th Floor St. Louis, MO 63105

Re: EEOC Charge Against City of Berkeley Police Dept.

No. 560201401383

Dear Mr. Daleen:

Because you filed the above charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and more than 180 days have elapsed since the date the Commission assumed jurisdiction over the charge, and no suit based thereon has been filed by this Department, and because you through your attorney have specifically requested this Notice, you are hereby notified that you have the right to institute a civil action under Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12111, et seq., against the above-named respondent.

If you choose to commence a civil action, such suit must be filed in the appropriate Court within 90 days of your receipt of this Notice.

The investigative file pertaining to your case is located in the EEOC St. Louis District Office, St Louis, MO.

This Notice should not be taken to mean that the Department of Justice has made a judgment as to whether or not your case is meritorious.

Sincerely,

Vanita Gupta

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Civil Rights Division

Raren L. Ferguson

Supervisory Civil Rights Analysi

**Employment Litigation Section** 

cc: St. Louis District Office, EEOC City of Berkeley Police Dept.

Case: 4:15-cv-01266-AGF Doc. #: 1-3 Filed: 08/18/15 Page: 22 of 25 PageID #: 53



## IN THE 21ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI

-500	
Judge or Division:	Case Number: 15SL-CC02097
TOM W DE PRIEST JR	
Plaintiff/Petitioner:	Plaintiff's/Petitioner's Attorney/Address
RICHARD DALEEN	ROBERT CARL SEIPP
	SUITE 700
	7800 FORSYTH BLVD.
Vs.	CLAYTON, MO 63105
Defendant/Respondent:	Court Address:
CITY OF BERKELEY	ST LOUIS COUNTY COURT BUILDING
Nature of Suit:	105 SOUTH CENTRAL AVENUE
CC Employmnt Discrmntn 213.111	CLAYTON, MO 63105

SHERIFF FEE PAID

(Date File Stamp)

### Summons in Civil Case

The State of Missouri to:	CITY OF BERKELEY
---------------------------	------------------

Alias:

CITY CLERK CITY OF BERKELEY 8425 AIRPORT ROAD BERKELEY, MO 63134 COURT SEAL OF

ST. LOUIS COUNTY

You are summoned to appear before this court and to file your pleading to the petition, a copy of which is attached, and to serve a copy of your pleading upon the attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner at the above address all within 30 days after receiving this summons, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to file your pleading, judgment by default may be taken against you for the relief demanded in the petition. SPECIAL NEEDS: If you have special needs addressed by the Americans With Disabilities Act, please

SPECIAL NEEDS: If you have special needs addressed by the Americans With Disabilities Act, please notify the Office of the Circuit Clerk at 314-615-8029, FAX 314-615-8739 or TTY at 314-615-4567, at least three business days in advance of the court proceeding.

23-JUN-2015

Date

Further Information:

	KAM		
	Sheriff's or Server's Return		
Note to serving officer:	Summons should be returned to the court within thirty days after	the date of issue.	
I certify that I have served	the above summons by: (check one)		
delivering a copy of the	ne summons and a copy of the petition to the Defendant/Respond	ent.	
leaving a copy of the	summons and a copy of the petition at the dwelling place or usua	abode of the Defendant/Respondent with	
	a person of the Defendant's/R	espondent's family over the age of 15 years	
(for service on a corpo	oration) delivering a copy of the summons and a copy of the petit	ion to	
	(name)	(4:	1.1
		1	tle).
- onlei			·
Served at		(addres	ss)
in	(County/City of St. Louis), MO, on	(date) at	time).
			timo).
Printed Nam	e of Sheriff or Server	Signature of Sheriff or Server	
	Must be sworn before a notary public if not served by an a		
(Seal)	Subscribed and sworn to before me on		
		(date).	
	My commission expires:		
Sheriff's Fees, if applical		Notary Public	
Summons	Sie C		
Non Est	\$		
Sheriff's Deputy Salary			
Supplemental Surcharge	\$10.00		
Mileage	\$ ( miles @ \$ per mile)		
Total	<b>\$</b>		
A copy of the summons as	nd a copy of the petition must be served on each Defendant/Re	spondent. For methods of service on all classes	of
suits, see Supreme Court R	Rule 54.		

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### THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI

Twenty First Judicial Circuit

### NOTICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES

### **Purpose of Notice**

As a party to a lawsuit in this court, you have the right to have a judge or jury decide your case. However, most lawsuits are settled by the parties before a trial takes place. This is often true even when the parties initially believe that settlement is not possible. A settlement reduces the expense and inconvenience of litigation. It also eliminates any uncertainty about the results of a trial.

Alternative dispute resolution services and procedures are available that may help the parties settle their lawsuit faster and at less cost. Often such services are most effective in reducing costs if used early in the course of a lawsuit. Your attorney can aid you in deciding whether and when such services would be helpful in your case.

### Your Rights and Obligations in Court Are Not Affected By This Notice

You may decide to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure if the other parties to your case agree to do so. In some circumstances, a judge of this court may refer your case to an alternative dispute resolution procedure described below. These procedures are not a substitute for the services of a lawyer and consultation with a lawyer is recommended. Because you are a party to a lawsuit, you have obligations and deadlines which must be followed whether you use an alternative dispute resolution procedure or not. IF YOU HAVE BEEN SERVED WITH A PETITION, YOU MUST FILE A RESPONSE ON TIME TO AVOID THE RISK OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT, WHETHER OR NOT YOU CHOOSE TO PURSUE AN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE.

### **Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures**

There are several procedures designed to help parties settle lawsuits. Most of these procedures involve the services of a neutral third party, often referred to as the "neutral," who is trained in dispute resolution and is not partial to any party. The services are provided by individuals and organizations who may charge a fee for this help. Some of the recognized alternative dispute resolutions procedures are:

- (1) <u>Advisory Arbitration:</u> A procedure in which a neutral person or persons (typically one person or a panel of three persons) hears both sides and decides the case. The arbitrator's decision is not binding and simply serves to guide the parties in trying to settle their lawsuit. An arbitration is typically less formal than a trial, is usually shorter, and may be conducted in a private setting at a time mutually agreeable to the parties. The parties, by agreement, may select the arbitrator(s) and determine the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted.
- (2) <u>Mediation:</u> A process in which a neutral third party facilitates communication between the parties to promote settlement. An effective mediator may offer solutions that have not been considered by the parties or their lawyers. A mediator may not impose his or her own judgment on the issues for that of the parties.

- (3) <u>Early Neutral Evaluation ("ENE")</u>: A process designed to bring the parties to the litigation and their counsel together in the early pretrial period to present case summaries before and receive a non-binding assessment from an experienced neutral evaluator. The objective is to promote early and meaningful communication concerning disputes, enabling parties to plan their cases effectively and assess realistically the relative strengths and weaknesses of their positions. While this confidential environment provides an opportunity to negotiate a resolution, immediate settlement is not the primary purpose of this process.
- (4) Mini-Trial: A process in which each party and their counsel present their case before a selected representative for each party and a neutral third party, to define the issues and develop a basis for realistic settlement negotiations. The neutral third party may issue an advisory opinion regarding the merits of the case. The advisory opinion is not binding.
- (5) Summary Jury Trial: A summary jury trial is a non binding, informal settlement process in which jurors hear abbreviated case presentations. A judge or neutral presides over the hearing, but there are no witnesses and the rules of evidence are relaxed. After the "trial", the jurors retire to deliberate and then deliver an advisory verdict. The verdict then becomes the starting point for settlement negotiations among the parties.

### Selecting an Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure and a Neutral

If the parties agree to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure, they must decide what type of procedure to use and the identity of the neutral. As a public service, the St. Louis County Circuit Clerk maintains a list of persons who are available to serve as neutrals. The list contains the names of individuals who have met qualifications established by the Missouri Supreme Court and have asked to be on the list. The Circuit Clerk also has Neutral Qualifications Forms on file. These forms have been submitted by the neutrals on the list and provide information on their background and expertise. They also indicate the types of alternative dispute resolution services each neutral provides.

A copy of the list may be obtained by request in person and in writing to: Circuit Clerk, Office of Dispute Resolution Services, 7900 Carondelet Avenue, 5th Floor, Clayton, Missouri 63105. The Neutral Qualifications Forms will also be made available for inspection upon request to the Circuit Clerk.

The List and Neutral Qualification Forms are provided only as a convenience to the parties in selecting a neutral. The court cannot advise you on legal matters and can only provide you with the List and Forms. You should ask your lawyer for further information.

delivering a copy of the summons and a copy of the petition to the Defendant/Respondent. leaving a copy of the summons and a copy of the petition at the dwelling place or usual abode of the Defendant/Respondent with a person of the Defendant's/Respondent's family over the age of 15 years. (for service on a corporation) delivering a copy of the summons and a copy of the petition to (title). other (address) (County/City of St. Louis), MO, on (time). Printed Name of Sher Must be sworn before a notary public if not served by an authorized officer: Subscribed and sworn to before me on (date) (Seal) My commission expires: Notary Public Sheriff's Fees, if applicable Summons Non Est Sheriff's Deputy Salary Supplemental Surcharge miles @ \$.\_\_\_\_ per mile) Mileage Total copy of the summons and a copy of the petition must be served on each Defendant/Respondent. For methods of service on all classes of see Supreme Court Rule 54.